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In this thesis, I describe and evaluate two recent accounts of naming. These accounts are 
motivated by Kripke’s response to Russell’s Description Theory of Names (DTN).  
Particularly, I consider Kripke’s Modal Argument (MA) and various arguments that have 
been given against it, as well as Kripke’s responses to these arguments. Further, I outline 
a version of MA that has recently been presented by Scott Soames, and consider how he 
responds to the criticisms that the argument faces. In order to evaluate the claim that MA 
is decisive against all description theories, I outline the Nominal Description Theory 
(NDT) put forth by Kent Bach and consider whether it constitutes a principled response 
to MA. I do so by exploring how Bach both responds to Kripke’s arguments against 
descriptivism and highlights the problems with rigid designation as a purely semantic 
thesis. Finally, I consider the relative merits of the accounts put forth by Bach and 
Soames. Upon doing so, I argue that MA is not as decisive against description theories as 
it has long been thought to be. In fact, NDT seems to provide a better account of our uses 
of proper names than the rigid designation thesis as presented by Kripke and Soames. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction: Three Influential Accounts of Names 
 
Three distinct views are central to the history of the debate about names. Each 
attempts to account for the seemingly strange behaviours that names exhibit in certain 
contexts. Historically, such views have attempted to maintain some degree of coherence, 
while also explaining how we can understand names in the contexts of identity, modality, 
and quotation. The above mentioned views are those presented by Frege, Russell, and 
Kripke.  
The Fregean view is based on Frege’s Theory of Mediated Reference (ToMR). It 
treats ‘meaning’ with respect to a name as ambiguous between the sense, or cognitive 
significance, and the reference, or the object in the world that is identified by the name. 
The Russellian view, alternately called the descriptivist account, is based on Russell’s 
Description Theory of Names (DTN). On this view, names are semantically equivalent to 
definite descriptions. As such, a name denotes the individual that uniquely fulfils the 
corresponding description. The Kripkean view, alternately called the rigid designation 
account, is based on Kripke’s causal account of naming, and historically upon a Millian 
(and distinct Russellian) conception of names as having only their referents for meanings. 
On Kripke’s view, names are bestowed on an individual in an initial act of baptism. 
These names are then used by others with the intention of using them in the same way as 
the person who performed the act of naming. While each of these views is motivated by a 
common desire to provide a coherent account of names, they also have their own unique 
motivations that inform their views.  
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In “On Sense and Reference”, Frege presents a view according to which the 
meaning of a name is composed of two separate but equally important components. He 
calls these the sense and the reference, respectively. He begins this work by enquiring 
into the nature of identity. In doing so, he asks how the statement ‘a=a’ differs from 
‘a=b’. The answer is that the former is an a priori necessary truth, whereas the latter tells 
us something about the world that we can only ascertain upon inspection. According to 
the theory he puts forth, this is because while ‘a’ and ‘b’ have the same reference, they 
have different senses. In discussing this distinction, Frege uses the classic example of 
“Hesperus is Phosphorous”. ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorous’ are both names for Venus, so 
why is it that a statement like ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ is trivially true, whereas one such as 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is both true and informative? The answer that Frege gives is 
that while both names have the same reference, they have different senses.  
The notion of reference is relatively straightforward. On Frege’s view, the 
reference of a name is its denotation. That is, a name’s reference is the thing in the world 
that the name picks out. So, in the example given above, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ 
have the same reference, namely Venus. The notion of sense is more abstract and not as 
easy to comprehend. On Frege’s view, the sense of a name is its cognitive significance, 
the individual concept that it picks out. Unlike that of reference, this definition is not 
immediately clear. This is because, unlike an object or individual with a real physical 
presence, it is not immediately obvious how a name is associated with a concept. Another 
way of understanding the sense of a name, though, is as the mode of presentation of its 
referent. By this we mean the way in which the individual in question is represented by 
the concept. The grasp of the sense of a name serves to show why the statement 
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‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is informative. While the sense of ‘Hesperus’ is ‘the evening 
star’, the sense of ‘Phosphorus’ is ‘the morning star’. These two different names provide 
us with two different ways of thinking about an object, in this case Venus, and so two 
different ways of representing it in our minds. Through this distinction, we can see why it 
is meaningful to learn that they have the same reference; it tells us something about the 
world. That is, the morning star and the evening star are the same object. This notion of 
the conceptual distinction between the senses of these two names is slippery, but serves to 
highlight how a name does more than just identify an object. It also carries with it 
conventionally associated conceptual content that helps us to partially understand the 
nature of the individual.  
This notion of sense is important to Frege’s view of language for a number of 
reasons. The first such reason is that sense determines reference. What this essentially 
means is that an object may have many names, each of which represent it in varying 
ways, but a sense determines at most one object. For all the concepts that can be 
associated with an individual, it remains that there is only one such individual. 
This provides us with the basics of ToMR. When we associate a name with an 
individual, the name is not only informative because it picks out an individual, but also 
because it is associated with a concept, which is for Frege a compositional constituent of 
a thought or proposition apt to be grasped psychologically. These two aspects together 
constitute the meaning of a name. 
The notion of sense is further important to Frege because of its implications for 
the rest of language, for example, via the Context Principle. As a methodological 
principle, he states that we should never attempt to determine the meaning of a word in 
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isolation but only in the context of a sentence. While he does not deny that individual 
words have meanings in isolation, Frege thinks that we should always consider the 
meanings of words in the context of the propositions in which they figure. As with other 
words, he claims that we only fully grasp the meanings of names when they are 
considered in this way. For Frege, when we consider the meaning of the name, we must 
ask what it contributes to the sentence. He wants to understand how we use names in 
these sentences, because we can only ever know the semantic-value of a word when we 
know what it contributes to sentences.  
For Frege, a sentence also has both a sense and a reference. In determining what 
each of these might be, he observes that each declarative sentence expresses a thought. 
He reasons that if we substitute co-referential names for each other within a sentence, this 
must not change the reference of the sentence because nothing in the reference of the 
names has changed. However, if the names have two distinct senses, the cognitive 
significance of the entire sentence is altered, and so the sentence contains a different 
thought. This leads us to conclude that the sense of a sentence is a thought, or the 
proposition which the sentence expresses. Such propositions can be either true or false. 
The reference of the sentence is its truth value, or the truth value of the proposition that it 
expresses. So, in order to say of a sentence whether it is true, we must first ascertain the 
proposition that it expresses. Once we have done so we can then determine whether or 
not the proposition is a true one, and so learn the reference of the sentence. In order to do 
this we must know the referents of the individual words which figure in the sentence. So, 
sentences can be seen as complex names that refer to either, as Frege puts it, the True or 
the False.  
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This analysis of sentence meaning seems, at first blush, relatively straightforward. 
However, as Frege attempts to fine-tune his view, numerous problem cases arise that 
must be taken into account. As he notes, many of these problems arise as a result of 
Leibniz’s law. This law states that if two linguistic items pick out the same individual, 
then one can be substituted for the other without changing the truth value of the sentence 
in which it figures. How can we say that, in all cases, sentences that refer to the True can 
be substituted one for the other? Simply put, they can’t. 
We use sentences to do more than just pick out and distinguish that which is true 
from that which is false. Sentences are used to relay information, and hence, their senses 
are just as important to their meaning as their references are. It is the sense of a sentence 
which determines its communicative value, often without consideration for its reference 
(i.e. whether or not it is true). Cases of quotation highlight this point by providing us with 
a way of speaking directly about a sentence. According to Frege, when we directly quote 
a sentence we name it. Thus, the reference of a direct quotation is the sentence which is 
being quoted. According to Frege, when we indirectly quote a sentence we do not use the 
sentence itself, but rather mention it. Moreover, by merely mentioning a sentence, the 
quotation takes on a different reference. The reference of an indirect quotation is not the 
truth value of the sentence, but rather the sense of the sentence being named. Frege calls 
this the indirect reference. He further refers to indirect sense, but does not explicitly state 
what this might be. However, if the customary sense of a sentence is the proposition that 
it expresses, it seems that the indirect sense ought to be any nuanced differences in 
meaning that arise when the same proposition is expressed in various ways. For example, 
any positive or negative connotation that the particular wording of an indirect quotation 
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adds to our understanding of how the person using the indirect quotation intends for us to 
understand it.  
Another key concern which arises with respect to Frege’s view of names is what 
is to be said about names which have no reference, or vacuous names. In discussing the 
senses and referents of sentences, I explained that Frege believed that declarative 
sentences express thoughts. He claims that usually when we consider the meaning of a 
sentence, we ask for both the thought it expresses and the truth-value of the proposition it 
expresses. He believes that the reason for this is that it is our quest for the truth that 
compels us to determine not just the cognitive significance of a sentence, but also 
whether or not it expresses a truth. However, in “On Sense and Reference”, Frege 
explains that we do not always have to ask for the truth-value of a sentence. One case in 
which we need not attempt to determine the reference of a sentence is when we are 
considering sentences which contain non-referring, or vacuous, names.  
Frege considers the example of the name ‘Odysseus’ and explains that, since it is 
likely that this name does not have a reference, the sentence “Odysseus was set ashore at 
Ithaca while sound asleep” is also unlikely to have a reference. In such fictional cases, he 
explains, the purpose of the sentence is not to convey information, and so we need not be 
concerned by the lack of reference. Rather, the purpose of the sentence is to express a 
particular idea in a certain light, and so we are only concerned with the thought that it 
expresses. Further, in the case of fiction and poetry, Frege explains that all we are 
interested in beyond the aesthetic value of the work are the thoughts and emotions that it 
evokes. He claims that questions of truth would serve to detract from our enjoyment of 
that experience, because they serve to deconstruct the artifice. Hence, the sentences in 
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which such names figure have no truth value. As we shall see, this becomes problematic 
because there are many vacuous names and non-referring expressions which figure into 
sentences which in reality are either true or false, and not merely indeterminate. 
Russell argues against Frege’s view and claims that it does not provide adequate 
solutions to the problems that it faces. Among his objections is the problem of vacuous 
names. He rejects the claim that sentences containing non-referring names have 
indeterminate truth-values in favor of the view that they are false. He uses the example 
“The present King of France is bald” to demonstrate this. On Russell’s view, this 
sentence expresses the proposition “There is exactly one individual such that it is the 
present King of France, and that individual is bald”. If we take the sentence to express 
that proposition, we understand that it must be false, since France presently has no king. 
This is because the sentence asserts a conjunction, of which one of the conjuncts is false. 
Thus, this sentence must be false, since it falsely asserts the existence of the individual 
denoted by the ‘the present King of France’ and if that individual does not exist then he 
cannot be bald. 
 Russell presents an alternative view on which names are considered to be 
semantically equivalent to definite descriptions. That is, for any given proper name, there 
is a definite description that constitutes the expressive content of that name and that 
description only refers to the individual so-called. It is only once that description is 
determined that the meaning of the name can be grasped. According to Russell, definite 
descriptions are those of the form “the F”. As such, they identify exactly one individual. 
That is, there is at least and at most one individual such that it is F. Russell uses the 
example of ‘the author of Waverley’, explaining that it is an example of a definite 
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description because it uniquely identifies a single individual, the individual that wrote 
Waverley. In this way, we can see that the individual to which the definite description 
refers is picked out in virtue of the fact that it is the only one that meets the description in 
question. By identifying a name with a definite description, we can make informative 
statements about the bearer of the name. Thus, by stating that “Scott is the author of 
Waverley” we provide information that identifies Scott to those not directly acquainted 
with him.  This is because by identifying the name ‘Scott’, with the description ‘the 
author of Waverley’, we provide information that allows those not directly acquainted 
with the individual in question to grasp the meaning of the name. It should be noted that 
is not necessary for ‘the author of Waverley’ to be the only such description. There might 
be a number of different non-necessary but sufficiently designative descriptions that only 
refer to that particular individual. 
This is one of the motivations for Russell’s view. He wants to reconcile the fact 
that we are often not immediately acquainted with the bearer of the names that we use 
with the empiricist intuition that, in order to understand a proposition, we must be 
acquainted with all of its constituents. This presents a problem if names are understood to 
be simple monolithic terms. This is because, if we must be directly acquainted with all of 
the constituents of a proposition and we are not acquainted with the bearer of a name, 
then such an account of names suggests that it will be impossible for us to understand any 
proposition in which it figures. However, this does not seem to be correct, since we often 
use names in sentences even though the bearers of such names are objects outside of our 
experience. Conversely, if names are understood to be definite descriptions, then the 
problem seems to be less threatening. This is because, if a name is semantically 
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equivalent to a definite description then, like a description, it can be further broken down 
into propositional functions, its component parts. Thus, it may be the case that even if we 
are not acquainted with the individual in question, we are sufficiently acquainted with the 
components of the description. If this is the case, then we can understand the name and so 
grasp the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it figures. 
This view allows names to be object independent. That is, both a name and the 
proposition in which it figures have meanings which do not depend on the existence of 
the individual which the name identifies. In the example given above, the name ‘Scott’ is 
object dependent, the truth conditions of all sentences involving that name depend on the 
individual that it picks out in the world. So, if someone does not know anything about 
Scott (i.e. is not directly acquainted with him) then he cannot understand any sentence 
that uses the name. By contrast, since “the author of Waverly” is a definite description, 
the truth conditions of any sentences in which such a description is used have truth 
conditions which depend only on the existence and accurate assignment of the 
description, and not on the existence or characteristics of any particular individual.  
Russell’s view of names also provides a neat solution to the problem of vacuous 
names and non-referring expressions. The solution is to acknowledge the simple fact that, 
when we use a name, unless we are directly acquainted with the individual in question, 
we do not know for sure that the name has a real-world extension. So, when determining 
the reference of a name, when we say that there is at least one individual that fits the 
description, we must add the caveat that this is only the case if it exists. So, in the 
example “Santa is generous” we understand the sentence as expressing the following 
proposition: “there is at least one jolly red-clad giver of Christmas presents, there is at 
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most one jolly red-clad giver of Christmas presents and, he is generous”. The name 
“Santa” is meaningful because it is associated with the description “jolly red-clad giver of 
Christmas presents”. Even though no one is directly acquainted with such an individual, a 
regular speaker of our language can grasp the meaning of the name. Moreover, because 
of our acquaintance with the constituents of such a description, we can grasp the 
proposition that is being asserted and ascertain its truth value. When we do this, we can 
determine that the proposition “there is at least one jolly red-clad giver of Christmas 
presents” is false. Since Santa does not exist, there is no such individual that fulfils this 
description, and so the entire proposition “Santa is generous” is false. 
Kripke takes exception to Russell’s view, because he believes that there is a 
significant difference between identifying an individual by means of a name, and doing 
so by means of a description. This is because Kripke believes that names are rigid 
designators, which do not depend on the content of a definite description to designate 
their bearers. This is important, because he is concerned with the problems that occur 
with counter-factual situations, or circumstances which did not in fact occur but could 
have. The reason that this is a concern is that, if the meaning of a name depends on the 
description of the individual that holds in this world, some explanation needs to be given 
to explain whether or not this name would still apply to the individual in question in 
another possible world in which the description did not hold. He uses the example on 
which we identify Aristotle as “the teacher of Alexander the Great”, and explains that 
while it is true in this world that this description refers to the man who we call Aristotle, 
it may not have been the case that Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander, and so the 
description does not correctly identify Aristotle in all possible worlds. Despite this, he 
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wants to say that regardless of whether or not Aristotle fit this description, Aristotle was 
still Aristotle, and this fact must be reflected in any account of naming. Kripke is 
concerned that those who adhere to DTN would have to say that if the description did not 
hold in a counter-factual situation, then we would have to say that the name does not 
identify the same individual. 
Kripke discusses both how names acquire their meanings, and how those 
meanings remain constant despite counter-factual situations that may arise in other 
possible worlds. He explains that names have a causal connection to their meanings, 
because the meaning of a name is determined by an intentional act of naming. According 
to Kripke, a “rough statement of a theory” might tell us that names are often associated 
with a given person or object (we will refer to the referent of a name as the individual) by 
a baptism or act of naming which connects the individual to the name explicitly. This 
could be accomplished either by ostension, that is pointing directly at the individual, or 
by the use of a description that fixes the reference of the name to the individual who is 
either not present or with whom we are not directly acquainted. The difference between 
this view and the one presented by Russell is that while Russell believes that the name 
and the description are synonymous, Kripke believes that while a description can be used 
to identify the individual being named, the individual need not fit that description in order 
to be considered the bearer of the name. Rather, all that is required is that the person who 
performs the act of naming intend to bestow a particular name upon a particular 
individual. Kripke believes that it is an advantage of his approach that if it turns out that 
the individual in question does not fit or is not uniquely identified by the description, the 
name would still be said to name the same individual. Once the initial baptism has been 
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performed, the name is normally used within the linguistic community. Each speaker, 
learning the name for the first time, must only intend to do so in reference to the same 
individual as the person from whom they learn it; the stronger epistemological 
requirements of Russell’s view are absent. Rather than grasping the meaning of a name 
by being acquainted with the corresponding description, speakers of the language need 
only know that it is the practice of the rest of the community to refer to that object using 
that name. 
This approach provides the basis for rigid designation. According to Kripke 
names rigidly designate their bearers. This means that a name refers to the same 
individual in all possible worlds containing that individual. This is true even for counter-
factual situations in which the individual has a different name. So, even in a possible 
world in which Aristotle’s parents decided to baptize him with a different name, for 
example ‘Bob’, the name ‘Aristotle’, as used by speakers in the actual world, still refers 
to the same individual. This is true regardless of whether or not the individual fulfils any 
given description including, it seems, being the bearer of the name. This is because all 
that is necessary for a name to refer to an individual is that that individual be the one who 
those who performed the initial act of naming intended it to refer to. If it turns out, as it 
might, that said individual is not described by a certain set of properties conventionally 
associated with it, the name still refers to that individual. This is because, as a rigid 
designator, the name names a particular individual and not necessarily one identified by a 
particular description or group of descriptions. 
In what follows, I will present and evaluate two recent accounts of naming. These 
accounts are motivated by Kripke’s response to Russell’s descriptivist view, particularly 
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his argument from the consideration of counterfactual situations. In Chapter 2, I outline 
Kripke’s Modal Argument (MA) and consider various arguments that have been given 
against it, as well as Kripke’s responses to these arguments. Also, in this chapter, I 
outline a version of MA that has recently been presented by Scott Soames, and consider 
how he responds to the criticisms that the argument faces. In Chapter 3, I outline a 
version of the descriptivist account that was put forth by Kent Bach and consider whether 
it constitutes a principled response to MA. I do so by exploring how Bach both responds 
to Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism and highlights the problems with rigid 
designation as a purely semantic thesis. In Chapter 4, the concluding chapter, I will 
consider the relative merits of the accounts put forth by Bach and Soames. I will evaluate 
them based both on the strength of their evaluation of and response to MA, as well the 
arguments that each gives against the views that the other presents. 
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Chapter 2 – Kripke and Soames: Rigid Designation and the Modal Argument 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, Kripke advances a view of names that is 
intended to respond to and refute Russell’s description theory. Kripke outlines a number 
of arguments against the description theory. One is that proper names and the 
descriptions that characterize the bearers of those names are not semantically equivalent. 
That is, the referent of a proper name cannot be ascertained by discovering the definite 
description, or cluster of descriptions, with which speakers of the language associate it. 
Another is that, when used in belief or knowledge reports, proper names and their 
associated descriptions are not substitutable without a loss or change in meaning. That is, 
the belief characterized by the use of a proper name is not always that same belief as that 
characterized by the corresponding description. The most influential and contentious 
argument that Kripke levels against the description theory is that, with respect to 
sentences containing modal operators (i.e. those indicating possibility and necessity), the 
truth conditions of sentences containing proper names and those containing descriptions 
are not always the same. Therefore, Kripke claims, proper names and the definite 
descriptions generally used to identify the bearer cannot be equivalent, because the 
description may not do so correctly in all possible worlds.  
This Modal Argument (MA) has received much attention from both adherents and 
detractors. Detractors have attempted to respond to Kripke’s arguments by explaining 
that he has misunderstood the nature of the definite descriptions that Russell discusses. 
Adherents have tried to both refine Kripke’s view by explaining, in careful detail, how 
the argument works against description theories and why such theories fail in the face of 
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this powerful argument, as well as showing why the arguments put forth by the detractors 
fail to refute it.  
In this chapter I will outline the argument as presented by Kripke and discuss the 
problems that it faces. I will also give an account of the argument as presented by Soames 
and explain why, according to him, the counter-arguments commonly given are not 
sufficient to refute the modal argument. The goal of this chapter is to give a coherent 
account of this view as a whole, by considering both MA itself and the larger 
understanding of names that it represents. 
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke explains the nature of rigid designators. A name 
rigidly designates its referent if, in all possible worlds, it refers to the same individual. As 
he explains:  
 
“If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid designators, it follows that ‘a=b’, if true, is a 
necessary truth. If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are not rigid designators, no such conclusion 
follows about the statement ‘a=b’ (though the objects designated by ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ will be necessarily identical)” (Kripke 3).  
 
With this explanation, Kripke makes it clear that while the relation of identity always 
holds between an object and itself, no such relation necessarily holds between the 
linguistic items that designate it. Names are rigid designators, while definite descriptions 
are not. As a result, whereas any two names for the same object necessarily refer to that 
object in all possible worlds, a name and a definite description that co-refer in one 
possible world need not co-refer in other possible worlds. An individual is necessarily 
self-identical, but it might have lacked that property by which the description picks it out 
in this world. 
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It should be noted that Kripke’s view is essentialist. Essentialism is the view that 
objects have essential properties – those without which an individual would not exist.  An 
accidental property, by contrast, is one without which the individual could still exist. 
Kripke’s view that objects have accidental properties is manifest is his account of 
naming, in fact it is the motivation. Clearly, for Kripke, being a politician or bearing a 
certain name are accidental qualities. Using Richard Nixon as an example, Kripke makes 
clear what he takes to be the essential properties of an individual when he tells us that 
“Certainly Nixon might not have existed if his parents had not gotten married, in the 
normal course of things. When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually 
mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed” (48). So it 
seems, for a person, genetic makeup is an essential property. If the only way for Nixon to 
exist was for his parents to have had a child then presumably only the particular child that 
they had (born of a particular sperm and egg) could be Nixon. It seems that there is no 
case, to Kripke’s mind, in which Nixon could have existed without being the particular 
human being, with the particular genetic makeup, that he was. This shows that while 
Nixon could have been something other than a politician, he could not have been 
anything other than a human being living at the time that he did. 
This idea of “possible worlds” or “counterfactual situations” is central to Kripke’s 
view of rigid designation and his arguments against the description theory put forth by 
Russell. The idea of possible worlds is contrasted with that of the actual world. The actual 
world is the world as we experience it, as it really exists. However, it is only one way in 
which the world might have been. Possible worlds are ways in which the world might 
have been different. To put it in other words, the actual world is the factual situation, the 
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way in which the world did, in fact turn out to be. By contrast, a counterfactual situation 
is a possible scenario in which the world could have turned out, contrary to the facts, to 
be different than it actually is. Kripke’s view of possible worlds is that they are  
 
“total ‘ways in which the world might have been’, or possible states or 
histories of the entire world… A practical description of the extent to 
which the ‘counterfactual situation’ differs in the relevant way from the 
actual facts is sufficient” (18).  
 
Thus one possible world could be identical to the actual world in every way, except that 
Aristotle’s parents may have chosen to name him ‘Aristocrates’. 
 Kripke’s MA is based on the idea that the Description Theory of Names (DTN) 
does not correctly explain the truth conditions of propositions involving the modal 
operators “could” or “might”. He uses the example of Aristotle and the actually co-
referring description ‘the greatest philosopher of antiquity’ to show that the truth values 
of propositions involving proper names and those involving supposedly equivalent 
definite descriptions are not the same. As he explains,  
 
“‘It might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher’ 
expresses a truth, though ‘It might have been the case that the greatest 
philosopher of antiquity was not a philosopher’ does not, contrary to 
Russell’s theory” (13).  
 
What this is intended to show is that it is true that it is conceivable that this individual, 
whom we know as Aristotle in the actual world, could have chosen some other profession 
and not been a philosopher. This is because, on Kripke’s view, being a philosopher is not 
a necessary quality of Aristotle as a person. (Presumably being a person is.) Conversely, 
this view suggests that it is necessary that the greatest philosopher of antiquity was a 
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philosopher and that it is nonsensical to think of it as being otherwise. This is because 
inherent in the quality of being the greatest philosopher of antiquity, is the more basic 
quality of being a philosopher.  
Further, this distinction is important because it highlights a difference in the 
individuals to whom it is possible for sentences to refer. Because names are rigid 
designators, it is impossible for the sentence about Aristotle to be about any individual 
other than Aristotle. The truth of a proposition regarding said individual relies on facts 
that obtain about the individual who bears the name Aristotle in the actual world. 
However, it is conceivable that, in some other possible world or even unbeknownst to us 
in the actual world, there was an individual living around the same time as Aristotle who 
was in fact a superior philosopher. This individual, although not the same person as 
Aristotle, would end up being the referent of ‘the greatest philosopher of antiquity’, 
contrary to the hypothesis that ‘Aristotle’ and ‘the greatest philosopher of antiquity’ are 
semantically equivalent. Kripke makes this clear when he explains that  
 
“the truth conditions of ‘It might have been the case that Aristotle was 
fond of dogs’ conform to the rigidity theory: no proof that some person 
other than Aristotle might have been both fond of dogs and the greatest 
philosopher of antiquity is relevant to the truth of the quoted statement’ 
(12).   
 
So we see that, in sentences involving definite descriptions, the truth conditions do not 
rely on facts regarding the individual to whom the description refers in the actual world. 
A possible reply from a description theorist is the argument that rigidity simply 
amounts to the practice whereby names are given wide scope over modal operators. The 
scope of an operator refers to the part of the sentence that is modified by the operator. If 
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the name is included in the scope of the modal operator then the name is said to have 
narrow scope, whereas if the scope of the operator does not include the existential 
quantifier associated with the name, on the DTN, then the name is said to have wide 
scope. To say that the scope is ambiguous is to say that it is unclear which part of the 
proposition falls within the scope of the modal operator. The reason for such an 
ambiguity is that the form of a natural language sentence often differs significantly from 
that of its counterpart logical proposition. Using logical notation, we can make clear 
which part of the proposition falls within the scope of the operator, and so avoid 
ambiguity. However, natural language is not so structured, and so it is often unclear 
which part of the sentence falls within the scope of the operator. So, it is often unclear 
what the correct scope ordering is for a sentence. 
 If a name takes wide scope, this means that the name is used to refer to the 
individual so-called in the actual world, regardless of the counterfactual situation. By 
contrast, if a name takes narrow scope, the name is used to refer to the individual so-
called in the counterfactual situation, regardless of its use in the actual world. Names that 
take wide scope are said to simulate rigidity because, like the rigidity view on which the 
name we refer to the individual so-called in the actual world, by giving the name wide 
scope we speak only of the individual to whom we refer using that name in the actual 
world. On the wide scope account the reason names are considered rigid designators is 
because of our practice of using a name to talk about the person so-called in the actual 
world even when we are talking about some counterfactual situation in which they are not 
so-called. On this view, names may be said to simulate rigidity because it allows us to 
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accept the claim that the name always refers to the same individual without accepting 
rigidity as a property of names.  
Kripke argues that this claim, that rigid designation amounts to the practice of 
always reading the name with wide scope, is mistaken (12). He argues that the wide 
scope account confuses the issue by shifting the focus from the use of names in general to 
their uses in propositions containing modal operators. He concedes that in some cases, the 
behavior with which he credits rigid designation could be interpreted as the result of a 
wide scope reading. However, he rejects the idea that considerations of scope can account 
for all of the behaviors of names that he sees as being the result of rigidity. Kripke uses 
two simple sentences, one containing a proper name and the other containing a definite 
description denoting the individual so-called, to demonstrate this. He argues that whereas 
‘Aristotle’ is rigid ‘the last great philosopher of antiquity’ is not. Moreover, the believes 
that the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators applies in non-modal 
contexts, including simple sentences such as “Aristotle was fond of dogs” and “The last 
great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs”. This is because, on his account, these 
two sentences have different truth conditions in counterfactual situations. However, this 
seems to be nothing more than a restatement of MA. This is because he is not really 
concerned with the truth conditions of these sentences. Rather, he is really concerned 
with the truth conditions of the sentences “It might have been the case the ‘Aristotle was 
fond of dogs’ was false” and “It might have been the case that ‘The last great philosopher 
of antiquity was fond of dogs’ was false”. 
Kripke’s argument for the difference in truth conditions seems problematic, 
because it seems to just reiterate the argument that the wide-scope view has already 
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addressed. In order to make the argument against such a view, it seems that Kripke must 
explain how we can consider the truth conditions of a simple sentence in a counterfactual 
situation, without considering what we would say about the counterfactual situation itself. 
He seems to make an argument counter to his original claim, the claim that when we 
consider counterfactual situations we are concerned with what we would say about them, 
which is exactly what arguments for wide-scope interpretations address. 
In his paper, “The Modal Argument”, Scott Soames presents his version of 
Kripke’s MA, and explores responses to Kripke that are based on a wide scope 
interpretation of names as descriptions. Soames’s goal is to provide an explication of 
Kripke’s view and to show that scope-based arguments are inadequate. He explains that 
the goal of MA is to demonstrate that a name derives it’s meaning from the individual it 
denotes, and not from a description associated with it. Kripke accomplishes this by 
demonstrating that the truth conditions of sentences containing names and those 
containing corresponding descriptions are not the same in modal contexts. Soames 
reconstructs the argument in a more structured way: 
 
(1) Proper names are rigid designators. 
(2) Therefore proper names do not have the same meanings as non-
rigid descriptions. So, if N is a proper name, and D is a non-rigid 
description, then the sentences N is F and D is F typically do not 
have the same meaning, or express the same proposition.  
(3) Since the descriptions commonly associated with names by 
speakers are non-rigid, typically the meanings of names are not 
given by those descriptions. So, if N is a name and D is a 
description associated with N by speakers, then the sentences N is 
F and D is F typically do not have the same meaning or express the 
same proposition (Soames, 1998, 2). 
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For Soames, the rigidity thesis (1) is a conclusion about the meaning of names based on 
our uses of them. That is, he considers how we use names when we describe 
counterfactual situations and draws a conclusion about their meaning based on our 
conventional uses in those situations. He observes that the truth conditions of 
propositions involving possible worlds always depend on the properties, in those possible 
worlds, of the individual so-called in the actual world. He argues that, whether or not an 
individual bears the name in question in some possible world, as long as it is identical 
with the individual that bears it in the actual world, propositions about that individual are 
judged true or false depending on the properties of that individual. 
Soames goes on to explain the reasoning that allows the argument to work as it 
does lies in understanding proper names as rigid designators. Using the Aristotle 
example, he explains that the reason that we think of names in this way is that, when we 
think about the truth values of propositions in which this name figures, no matter whether 
the proposition deals with the actual world or some other possible world, they always 
depend on the identity of Aristotle in this world with that same individual in any possible 
world in question. As he explains: 
 
our ultimate ground for thinking that the name Aristotle is a rigid 
designator is our conviction that there is a certain individual x, such that 
for every possible world w, the proposition that Aristotle was a 
philosopher is true at w iff x was a philosopher at w, and similarly for 
other propositions (2). 
 
(Generalized to all propositions using the term ‘Aristotle’, Soames calls this ‘ultimate 
ground’ principle GR.) So we see that it is a necessary fact that the individual named 
‘Aristotle’ in this world is the same individual in all possible worlds. In other words, 
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‘x=x’ is a logical truth quite independently of what name x may bear in various worlds. 
By contrast, “Aristotle was a philosopher” is intuitively not true in some possible worlds. 
Whether or not it is true does not depend on the identity of the individual, but on the state 
of the world in question, or as Soames puts it “whether or not the person we call Aristotle 
in this world is a philosopher in w” (2). When we describe possible worlds in which 
Aristotle is not a philosopher, it is Aristotle who is not a philosopher in those worlds. The 
truth-conditions of such statements implicate the person himself, and not those of his 
actual properties by which a description picks him out. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this premise is that the meaning of a name 
is not the same as the meaning of a description. A name refers to a certain individual. 
This meaning holds across all worlds, regardless of the descriptions used to characterize 
that individual. By contrast, a description refers to the individual, in any given world, that 
is characterized by it. This does not hold across all worlds. In some worlds the individual 
may fit the description associated with the name in our world, but in others it may not. 
This means that the meaning of the description varies according to the contingent facts of 
the world in question. So if we say that in this world N is F and D is F, we must 
understand that while these propositions have the same truth values in this world, we can 
conceive of a world in which N is F, but D is not F. This is because N always refers to the 
same individual, but D only refers to the individual who happens to fill the description, 
and that may not always be the same individual in a given world. Hence, we see that the 
two propositions do not mean the same thing. 
Proceeding from principle (GR), Soames explores the viability of using a wide 
scope interpretation of definite descriptions to correct for any discrepancies between the 
   
25 
meanings of sentences containing proper names and those containing definite 
descriptions, which characterize the same individuals in the actual world. He considers 
what would happen if we tried to simulate the rigidity of proper names by taking definite 
descriptions to have wide scope in modal statements. He replaces the name Aristotle with 
a hypothetically equivalent description, “the G” to derive principle SR (i): “There is a 
certain individual x, such that for every possible world w, the proposition that the G was 
a philosopher is true at w iff x was a philosopher at w,… and so on for other propositions 
expressed using the name Aristotle” (3).  As Soames explains, “the G” is a description of 
the individual Aristotle as he was in the actual world, which takes a wide scope over the 
modal operator. The claim is that on this account, we should understand any sentence in 
which the name ‘Aristotle’ figures, not as referring to the individual Aristotle, regardless 
of which descriptions characterize him in a given world, but as referring to that individual 
who satisfies the description in this world. On Soames account, the argument in favour of 
the wide scope interpretation does not privilege the individual Aristotle, regardless of 
whether or he actually fits this description, but rather that it privileges the person who 
satisfies the description “the G”, regardless of whether or not that person is identical with 
Aristotle. This seems problematic because GR always identifies Aristotle as Aristotle, 
and would continue to do so even if it turned out that Aristotle was not the G. By 
contrast, it seems that SR (i) always identifies Aristotle as the G, and would continue to 
do so even if it turned out that Aristotle was not the G. So, while GR always identifies the 
correct individual, SR (i) does not. However, one possibility that Soames fails to consider 
is that it is not the case that there is no definite description that could always identify the 
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correct individual, but rather that ‘the G’ is simply not that description. It is conceivable 
that the correct description would always yield the same results as ‘Aristotle’. 
Soames demonstrates what he believes to be the problem with the wide scope 
analysis by showing that the truth conditions of the propositions that ought to follow from 
the semantic equivalence of a proper name and a definite description do not actually 
coincide. He explains that if the name n is equivalent to “the G”, then “If n is F, then 
something is both F and G” expresses the same proposition as “If the G is F, then 
something is both F and G” (5).  He further explains that “if the G is F, then something is 
both F and G” must necessarily be true. The problem arises when we attempt to substitute 
the seemingly equivalent propositions, so that we might claim that “if n is F, then 
something is both F and G is a necessary truth” (6). According to the reasoning of the 
wide scope argument, this claim should hold true after substituting the seemingly 
semantically equivalent terms n and “the G”. However, this cannot be the case because 
there is no necessary connection between an individual bearing the name n and fitting the 
description “the G”. On this account of definite descriptions, it seems hard to see why we 
should accept the claim that the meaning of a name is simply a definite description that 
uniquely identifies the individual in the actual world. Soames thinks that this is reason to 
believe that the wide scope analysis does not adequately account for the features of 
names that lead Kripke to suppose that they are rigid designators.  
Another possible alternative to the rigid designation view is that proper names are 
synonymous with actually-rigidified descriptions. On this view, we say that a definite 
description is actually-rigidified if the description is preceded by the word ‘actually’. This 
is because ‘actually’ acts indexically to designate the world of the speaker, whether it is 
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our actual world, or some other possible world. It should be noted that, for simplicity, I 
will assume that the context of utterance is the actual world. So, the expression “the 
actual G” is used to designate the individual which uniquely satisfies the description ‘the 
G’ in the actual world. Moreover, since ‘actually’ acts indexically, “the actual G” as used 
in counterfactual situations refers to the individual in a possible world who satisfies ‘the 
G’ in the actual world. On this view, proper names are actually-rigidified descriptions 
because, since the indexical ‘actually’ fixes the referent of the description as the 
individual who satisfies it in the actual world, we can ensure that the description always 
refers to the same individual regardless of the counterfactual situation, if that individual 
exists. 
Soames argues against the identification of names with actually-rigidified 
descriptions. He claims that, by considering how we ascribe propositional-attitudes to 
individuals in other possible worlds, we can see that an actually-rigidified description 
does not denote the same individual as the corresponding proper name. He explains that it 
may be the case that individuals in other possible worlds have beliefs about other 
individuals in those worlds: Soames’s point seems to be that the claim that ‘Aristotle’ and 
‘the actual greatest philosopher of antiquity’ are semantically equivalent commits us to 
making the claim that when we ascribe a belief about Aristotle to an individual in some 
possible world, we are ascribing to them a belief about the actual greatest philosopher of 
antiquity and, by extension, the actual world. He does not believe that this is appropriate 
because, to a person in another possible world the description ‘the actual greatest 
philosopher of antiquity’ might not refer to Aristotle. He makes his case against proper 
names as actually-rigidified descriptions with the following argument:  
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P1. It is possible to believe that Aristotle was a philosopher without 
believing anything about the actual world Aw. In particular, there are 
worlds w* in which agents believe that Aristotle was a philosopher, 
without believing of Aw that anything was F in it, and hence without 
believing of Aw that the unique thing that was F in it was a 
philosopher. 
P2. Necessarily one believes that the actual F was a philosopher iff one 
believes of the actual world, Aw, that the unique thing that was F in it 
was a philosopher 
C1. It is not the case that necessarily one believes that Aristotle was a 
philosopher iff one believes that the actual F was a philosopher 
P3. If the content of Aristotle, as used in a context C, were identical with 
the content of the actual F, as used in C, then (i) the contents of 
(proposition expressed by) Aristotle was G and The actual F was G in 
C would be the same, (ii) the propositions expressed by α believes that 
Aristotle was G and α believes that the actual F was G, would be 
necessarily equivalent, and (iii) C1 above would be false. 
C2. The content of Aristotle, as used in a context, is not the same as the 
content of the actual F as used in that context (15). 
 
Soames’s argument seems to turn on a confusion about what it means to ascribe beliefs 
about the actual greatest philosopher of antiquity. He is correct in saying that P1 is true. It 
is possible to hold beliefs about Aristotle without holding beliefs about the actual world. 
In fact, it is possible to hold beliefs about Aristotle without holding beliefs about whether 
or not he was the greatest philosopher of antiquity. However, his P2 is more problematic. 
He claims that a belief that the actual greatest philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher 
is the belief that, in Aw, the unique individual who was the greatest philosopher of 
antiquity was a philosopher.  
This seems to be confused because the actually-rigid description thesis requires 
only that a belief that the actual greatest philosopher of antiquity was a philosopher is the 
belief that, in whatever world the believer inhabits, the unique individual who was the 
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greatest philosopher in the actual world was a philosopher in that world. As a result, what 
the believer believes about Aristotle has nothing to do with the actual world other than 
the fact that the individual of whom it is believed satisfies the description ‘the greatest 
philosopher of antiquity’ in the actual world. The state of mind of the believer need not 
include this. So, while C1 is correct on Soames’s understanding of actually-rigid 
descriptions, it is based on a misinterpretation of the view and so is incorrect.  
This confusion becomes further evident when we consider P3. For any context of 
utterance, the word “actually” refers indexically to the speaker’s world. So, in the actual 
world, the content of ‘Aristotle was a philosopher’ and ‘the actual greatest philosopher of 
antiquity was a philosopher’ is the same. Moreover, the propositions asserting an 
individual’s beliefs about the bearers of the name and the actually-rigidified description 
are the same. So, if the speaker is in the actual world then C1 is clearly false because it is 
necessary that one can hold a belief about Aristotle if and only if one can hold that same 
belief about the actual greatest philosopher of antiquity. Conversely, in another possible 
world, “actually” refers indexically to that possible world. If we suppose that in that 
world, the content of ‘Aristotle’ is not the same as that of ‘the greatest philosopher of 
antiquity’, then propositions asserting an individual’s beliefs about the bearers of these 
two expressions are not the same. This seems to be why Soames asserts that it is not the 
case that holding a belief about one amounts to holding a belief about the other.  
What he fails to realize is that any statements about the possibility of holding 
beliefs in certain counterfactual situations that we make are made in the actual world, and 
so the context of utterance is one in which ‘Aristotle’ and ‘the actual greatest philosopher 
of antiquity’ have the same referent, and so we can use them to make statements about 
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the beliefs of individuals inhabiting other possible worlds, without ascribing to them 
beliefs about the actual world, just as the individuals inhabiting other possible worlds can 
make statements about our beliefs without ascribing beliefs about their world to us. This 
seems to be a confusion between the context of utterance and the context of belief. 
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Chapter 3 – Bach: Nominal Description Theory and Semantic Incompleteness 
 
Despite the challenges that the Modal Argument (MA) presents for the 
Description Theory of Names (DTN), there are those who still adhere to a view on which 
names are semantically equivalent to definite descriptions. They persist in this view 
because they believe a descriptivist view can provide principled solutions to many 
problems for which the rigidity thesis cannot. Therefore, rather than abandon 
descriptivism in favor of a Kripkean view, these philosophers propose modifications to 
the description theory that they believe would avoid the criticisms posed by the MA. 
Kent Bach is one such philosopher. He agrees with Kripke that DTN, as often 
conceived, is implausible, but believes that a description theory is still the best 
explanation of the behavior of proper names in natural language. His view is motivated 
by the understanding that “we must take seriously Mill’s exception to his claim that 
names convey no information about the individuals we use them to refer to ‘except that 
those are their names’” (Bach, 2002, 75). With this is mind, he proposes a description 
theory on which being so-called is the only property relevant to the association of a name 
with an individual. 
In his work on the meaning of proper names (Thought and Reference, 1987, and 
“Giorgione was so-called because of his name”, 2002), Bach responds to the criticisms of 
description theories put forth by Kripke and Soames. In an attempt to salvage the 
explanatory power of description theories, without succumbing to MA, he proposes the 
Nominal Description Theory (NDT). On this view, as with DTN, a name is semantically 
equivalent to a definite description which uniquely identifies the individual so-called. 
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Unlike DTN, however, he claims that this description is always and only “the bearer of 
‘N’”, for any name N. Bach claims that this theory respects the spirit of DTN, while 
better accounting for how we use proper names in natural language. On his account, 
descriptions are semantically incomplete. Thus, even when we properly identify the 
description to which the name is equivalent, this itself is not enough to determine a 
unique referent. Other information, including the context of use, is necessary to determine 
which bearer of the name a speaker is talking about. Moreover, while Kripke claims that 
his view is purely semantic, he provides no way of correctly identifying the referent 
outside of the context of use. 
The goal of this chapter is to explore the possibility of NDT as an adequate 
response to Kripke’s view of rigid designation. I will give an account of NDT and present 
what I understand to be Bach’s motivation for presenting such a view. In doing so, I will 
examine the claims that Bach makes in favor of NDT and consider his reasons for 
adopting such a view in light of MA and considerations of scope. In particular, I will 
present the formulation of MA to which Bach is responding and consider how this 
understanding of the argument allows him to formulate his view. Further, I will discuss 
what he calls the “illusion of rigidity” and explain how this relates to the considerations 
of scope examined in the previous chapter. 
What does it mean to say that a name is semantically equivalent to the definite 
description that identifies its referent as the bearer of the name? As we have seen above, 
this theory can be schematized as follows: N means “the bearer of ‘N’”, where N is any 
proper name. The description provides no information about the individual so-called 
except that she is so called. 
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Bach contends that the reason that one name can be used to denote many bearers 
is that names are semantically equivalent to definite descriptions and most definite 
descriptions are semantically incomplete. That is, the properties that they predicate are 
not unique to a single individual (2002, 90). He acknowledges that this may seem like a 
strike against NDT, but explains that since the speaker’s intended meaning when uttering 
a sentence is typically determined pragmatically, the incompleteness of names does not 
imply the impossibility of determining their referents. Rather, it implicates pragmatics as 
necessary for determining the individual denoted by a name as used in a context. Bach 
further explains that the semantic incompleteness of names is not a semantic fact, rather it 
is pragmatic. He claims that “since incompleteness is not a semantic property of 
descriptions, incomplete descriptions make the same sort of semantic contribution to 
sentences in which they occur as do complete ones” (1987, 125). This is because there is 
nothing in the linguistic meaning of a name that indicates the existence of multiple 
bearers. Moreover, the fact that the semantic content of a name is a definite description 
implies that the name, as used, denotes one of its bearers. What it does not make explicit 
is which bearer. This information must be filled in pragmatically based on the use of the 
name in the context of utterance. Bach concludes that the semantic incompleteness of 
names does not pose a threat to description theories because the context of use provides 
sufficient information for a listener to determine the speaker’s intention when using a 
name (2002, 92). 
Kripke presents his view of rigid designation as a semantic thesis about the 
meaning of names. He claims that the reference of a name is wholly determined by its 
semantic content. As such, he denies that names are semantically incomplete and so must 
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provide a different explanation for how names determine their referents. More 
specifically, he must account for how a name can be used to designate more than one 
individual and still designate rigidly. Bach suggests that   
 
Shared names… force the [rigidity] thesis to be relativized to uses of 
names. As [Kripke] writes, “That more than one proposition may be 
expressed by [‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’] is irrelevant: the question is 
whether each such proposition is evaluated as I describe it; or is it not….” 
However, Kripke is forced to regard the sentence as having “various 
readings,” one for each bearer of the name in question (2002, 89). 
 
Bach explains that in order to maintain such a view, while accounting for the fact that a 
name can be used in various contexts to refer to various individuals, Kripke must 
relativize rigidity to uses of names. That is, he must take rigidity to be a property of the 
uses of names, and not of names themselves. Each name must be seen as having various 
readings which, when applied appropriately, designate the same individual in all possible 
worlds. The name itself, however, has no univocal reading on this view. 
Bach believes that this is a problem for Kripke, because it is hard to see how we 
can view the differences between uses of names as a semantic difference, when there is 
nothing about the various instances of names themselves that indicate that they refer to 
one individual and not another. Rather, it is the understanding of a name as used in 
context that indicates how the name is being used.  
 
Once RDT is relativized to the uses of names, it becomes not only trivial, 
but misdirected. For if we individuate uses by bearers while recognizing 
that shared names are not thereby ambiguous, we must acknowledge that 
RDT thus relativized is no longer a thesis about the semantics of names 
but one about uses of names to refer. Nothing about the semantics of 
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names tells us which of its bearers it is being used to refer to on a given 
occasion (1987, 156). 
 
If this is the case, Kripke cannot provide a fully semantic account which can explain how 
the same name can be used to refer to many individuals. Thus, this relativized rigidity 
suggests that rigid designation can only be explained pragmatically. This seems 
problematic for a view which bases its objection to DTN and other descriptions theories 
on the fact that such theories require a pragmatic account of how names denote their 
bearers. 
Bach explains what he believes are two advantages of NDT as an account of the 
meanings of proper names. The fist is that on this view, the definite description to which 
a name is semantically equivalent is such that the name may only denote an individual 
who is so-called. This is an advantage because it properly associates the meaning of a 
name with how it is used. That is, a name can only refer to an individual that is called by 
that name. This is because the description associated with “the bearer of ‘N’” cannot 
attribute to N a property that he does not possess. 
This is closely associated with the second advantage of NDT, which is that this 
account does not require that a name have any content that describes its bearer. This may 
seem strange for a view that calls itself a description theory, in as much as it does not 
associate any additional properties with the name. The only information that the 
description “the bearer of ‘N’” provides about the individual, N, is that he is called ‘N’. 
Since this description does not rely on any additional information about accidental 
properties that N may possess, the content of the name cannot properly be understood as 
descriptive. As Bach explains:  
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the property of bearing a certain name, does not count as an element of 
descriptive content, unlike such properties as writing a certain book or 
proving a certain theorem. After all, no one who has this intuition, not 
even Mill or Kripke, would deny that a name at least conveys the 
information that its bearer bears it (135). 
 
By advocating a description theory on which the description associated with a name 
expresses only the property of bearing the name, Bach is able to accommodate the view 
that the only information that a name expresses is that the bearer is so-called. Moreover, 
unlike Mill and Kripke, who also hold this view, Bach seems to provide a principled 
account of how the name conveys this information.  
One question that arises is that, if we simply want an account of names on which 
the only information that a name conveys is that is names its bearer, it seems unnecessary 
to add the descriptive content, “the bearer of ‘N’” when we could simply say that ‘N’ 
always refers to the individual, N. Bach’s response to this is that while both Mill and 
Kripke endorse this interpretation, neither provides an account which explains how 
names can convey this information. Thus, the additional descriptive element is needed. 
As he explains in a footnote to the passage above:  
 
 
Indeed, Kripke remarks that ‘the linguistic function of a proper name is 
completely exhausted by the fact that it names its bearer’ (1979, 240), 
though he does not indicate or imply how his own theory can account for 
this. And Mill, whom Kripke credits with the view that names denote 
directly …, remarks that proper names ‘do not indicate or imply any 
attributes as belonging to … the individuals who are called by them…. 
[W]hen we say, pointing to a man, this is Brown or Smith,…we do not 
merely by so doing convey… any information about them except that 
those are their names’ (1872, 20-2; my emphasis) (135 n. 6). 
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This seems to indicate that both Mill and Kripke believe that names are used to convey 
the fact that an individual is so-called, but do not provide an account of how this 
information is conveyed. Examination of their views yields no answers to the question of 
how names fulfill this function. So, we must ask on what grounds we could justify a view 
that accounts for the intuition that names merely express the information that their bearer 
bears them while providing no additional information about the individual.  
Rather than consider MA as Kripke himself presented it, Bach refers to a 
schematized version originally presented by Brian Loar: 
 
(a) If ‘N’ meant ‘the F’ then ‘N might not have been the F’ would be 
false. 
But 
(b) ‘N might not have been the F’ is true. 
Therefore, 
(c) ‘N’ does not mean ‘the F’. 
Assume here that ‘N’ has but one bearer, that N is the actual F, and that 
‘the F’ is the description which, according to the description theory in 
question, is synonymous with ‘N’. This pattern of argument is formally 
valid, Loar points out, provided that ‘N’… takes the same scope in (b) 
relative to ‘might’ as it does in (a). However, Loar suggests that the 
argument trades on an illicit shift of scope (1987, 150). 
 
This version of MA is quite different than the one presented by Soames. It makes no 
explicit reference to rigidity, nor does it consider, as part of the argument, the nature of 
descriptions. Presumably, this is because, on the view being advocated by the authors, 
there is no semantic difference between names and the definite descriptions that 
characterize them. However, given that Bach is claiming to give a version of the 
argument for the purposes of explanation and examination, a fuller account explaining the 
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reasons for the apparent difference, whether or not they turn out to be problematic, seems 
warranted.  
Both Soames and Bach are responding directly to Kripke’s MA. Both schematize 
this argument for the sake of simplicity and clarification. This is because Kripke’s 
argument emerges in the course of discussing what he sees as the problems with the 
Russellian view of proper names. He discusses issues such as essentialism, modality and 
rigid designation, and develops his argument in the course of this discussion. In 
presenting the versions of the argument that they do, each presents a version of the 
argument that is slanted towards the arguments that they themselves are making. While 
neither one presents a view that misrepresents Kripke’s view, neither one presents a view 
that fully captures its complexity. This is because of both the nature of schematization, 
which necessarily excludes subtle details necessary for constructing the argument, and 
with the nature of interpretation, which itself is often driven by the theory being argued 
for. While Soames focuses more heavily on rigid designation, for the purposes of arguing 
against description theories and wide scope interpretations, Bach focuses more heavily on 
modal properties, for the purposes of arguing against what he sees as an illicit shift in 
scope that allows the argument to work. In light of these considerations, in giving an 
account of this argument, it should be made clear that what is at issue here it is what 
Kripke sees as the difference between the modal qualities of definite descriptions and 
those of proper names as rigid designators. Ultimately, the differences between the 
formulations given by Bach and Soames amount to a question of whether or not rigid 
designation is a premise of MA, or a conclusion. 
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Fundamentally, MA is about whether or not names can refer to the same 
individual in all possible worlds. On Kripke’s view, this is a necessary part of being a 
name, and his argument is based on this. In arguing against the descriptivist view, Kripke 
assumes that no definite description can be relied upon to consistently designate the 
referent of the name in all possible worlds. This is because he formulates the argument 
based on his view that names are rigid designators, whereas descriptions are not. On the 
account given by Bach, this is not an acceptable argument because the scope of ‘N’ in (a) 
is different from the scope of ‘N’ in (b), taking a narrow scope in (a) and a wide scope in 
(b). As discussed in the previous chapter, if a name takes wide scope it is used to refer to 
the individual so-called in the actual world, regardless of the counterfactual situation, 
whereas if a name takes narrow scope it is used to refer to the individual so-called in the 
counterfactual situation, regardless of its use in the actual world. So, he claims that while 
the referent of ‘N’ in (a) is contingent on the facts of a given possible world, in (b) ‘N’ 
always refers to the individual so named and characterized in the actual world. As Bach 
points out, this problem does not arise on a wide scope reading, since the description 
simply designates in the proposition whatever it designates in the actual world. This 
reading seems reasonably justified once we consider the argument as applied to NDT.  
Applying MA to NDT yields the following results: 
 
(an) If ‘N’ meant ‘the bearer of “N”’ then ‘N might not have been the 
bearer of “N”’ would be false. 
But 
(bn) ‘N might not have been the bearer of “N” is true. 
Therefore, 
(cn) ‘N’ does not mean ‘the F’ (150-151). 
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Bach explains that (an), like (a), is only true if read with a narrow scope. This is because, 
to say that it is true that ‘N might not have been the bearer of “N”’, we must acknowledge 
that the bearer of ‘N’ in the actual world might not have been the bearer of that name in 
some possible world. This can mean, depending on how we interpret such a sentence, that 
it could have been the case that the bearer of ‘N’ was not so called or it could mean that 
the individual who we know as the bearer of ‘N’ was not the same individual, and both 
would be false if N must be the bearer of that name in all possible worlds. 
Having established that in order for the first premise to be true, N must be given 
narrow scope, Bach goes on to ask whether or not the second premise is true on the same 
reading. He explains that, just as (b) tells us that it might not have been the case that the 
individual characterized by the description ‘the F’ was the individual N, given narrow 
scope (bn) seems to tell us that it might not have been the case the bearer of “N”, that is 
the individual characterized by ‘the bearer of “N”’, was the individual N. This of course 
seems to support Kripke’s argument against description theories, since if N is not always 
characterized as bearing the name “N”, then the description ‘the bearer of “N”’ cannot 
mean the same thing as N. This is because it seems to be the case that in order to be 
characterized as bearing the name “N”, one must be so named. 
Bach admits that this poses a potential problem for NDT. He explains that this is 
because given either a narrow or a wide scope, (bn) still seems to be true.  As he explains:  
 
For it might be that where names are involved, the effect of narrow scope 
is the same as wide scope, that is that scope makes no difference. Along 
these lines it could be argued against NDT and in support of (bn) that 
NDT mistakenly identifies the referent of ‘N’ with respect to a 
counterfactual situation with the bearer of ‘N’ in that situation. Even 
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though ‘N’ takes narrow scope rather than wide, its referent relative to that 
situation is the actual N… But the referent of ‘the bearer of “N” relative to 
that situation is not the actual N. So (bn) is true, even on the narrow scope 
reading, and ‘N’ does not mean ‘the bearer of “N” (151). 
 
It is true both that we can imagine a situation in which N was not named “N”, and that we 
can imagine a situation in which the individual so-named was not N, but someone else. 
Either of these readings seems potentially problematic for any description theory because 
if scope makes no difference, then MA is valid on all readings. On this view, it seems 
inconceivable that we could claim that the meaning of a name is semantically equivalent 
to a given description, and then show that it is possible for that description to fail to 
describe the bearer of the name, or for the bearer of the name to be someone other than 
the individual so described. However, while this is a problem for DTN, it poses little 
threat to NDT. This is because this argument discredits only those descriptions theories 
on which names admit no such ambiguity, but NDT is not one such a theory. 
 As he goes on to hypothesize above, a potential problem faced by NDT is that it 
might be interpreted as the claim that the name N has meaning only relative to the 
possible world in question. Thus, the meaning of “N” in the actual world might would be 
different from that of “N” in a possible world, just in case the bearers of the name in the 
two worlds were two different individuals. However, this is perfectly in keeping with 
Bach’s view that names are semantically incomplete. On this view, the content of a name 
is not satisfied by a single individual. Rather, as we have seen, names can be used in 
various ways to refer to individuals depending on the context of use. Thus, while he 
admits that names are typically used to denote the individuals who bear them in the actual 
world, there are exceptions to this.  
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Bach responds to the claim that description theories commit us to the view that 
definite descriptions, and names by extension, always take wide scope with respect to 
modal operators. He concedes that names standardly take wide scope, but takes pains to 
make explicit the fact that there are legitimate instances of uses of names which parallel 
narrow scope nominal descriptions:  
 
… I do not concede that names do always take wide scope. I grant… that 
they standardly take wide scope, but as the word ‘standardly’ suggests, I 
take this to be a pragmatic fact, not a semantic one (145-146). 
 
Bach emphasizes that the standard interpretation of names as wide scope descriptions 
reflects a pragmatic fact about the sort of information that we understand a speaker 
intends to convey by using a name. This information is not semantic, about its linguistic 
meaning, or syntactic, reflecting the logical form of the sentence. That is, names can take 
narrow scope in certain situations, such as when the speaker intends to demonstrate that a 
name could have denoted an individual who does not actually bear it, while they take 
wide scope when the speaker is conveying information about an individual who actually 
bears it. However, there is nothing inherent in the meaning of a name that tells us how it 
is used.  
Using the example of ‘Spiro Agnew’ as contrasted with the fictional ‘Aaron 
Aardvark’, Bach demonstrates how a name can be used with narrow scope. He contrasts 
“Spiro Agnew might have been president (8)”, with “Aaron Aardvark might have been 
president (10)” and explains that  
 
Who Aaron Aardvark is, if anyone, has no bearing on the statement being 
made with (10) and indeed the speaker may not believe that anyone 
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possesses this name, much less intend his audience to believe it. His 
statement is true if there is a possible world in which whoever possesses 
the name is president… So as used here ‘Aaron Aardvark’ has narrow 
scope with respect to might (147).  
 
Bach explains that the reason we can more readily understand a name such as ‘Aaron 
Aardvark’ as taking narrow scope is that there is no individual, at least in the context of 
political discourse, with whom we would typically associate that name. We are inclined 
to understand a name as taking wide scope when there is a particular person with whom it 
is associated in a given context. However, the fact that a name is typically used to denote 
someone does not mean that it must be used in such a way. Bach explains that 
 
‘Spiro Agnew’ can also be so used. Suppose that someone is 
contemplating a procedure whereby the president is selected on the basis 
of alphabetical order from a list of state governors. He has never heard of 
Nixon’s first vice-president but he imagines, for the sake of discussion that 
‘Spiro Agnew is the name of a state governor. If he uttered (8) under these 
circumstances, he would be using ‘Spiro Agnew’ as having a narrow 
scope – who actually bears the name would be irrelevant to his statement 
(147). 
 
It is precisely because we are accustomed to using the name ‘Spiro Agnew’ to refer to the 
individual so-called in the actual world, that we resist interpreting the name as taking 
narrow scope. However, there is nothing in the semantic content of a name that requires 
that a name be interpreted as taking wide scope. Rather, we are used to names taking 
wide scope, and so generally anticipate that they will be used to denote the individual so-
called in the actual world. That said, it is within the listener’s ability to recognize that in 
certain contexts, while we are not suggesting that the individual who actually bears the 
name might have been someone other than himself, we do recognize that the name can be 
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used to convey the information that it might have been the case that some other individual 
bore the name. 
So, with respect to our normal use of names, when we use a name, even if we use 
it to refer to an individual in some possible world, we are talking about the individual so-
called in the actual world. This is because we are in the actual world, speaking English to 
refer to a particular individual who bears the name. We can recognize that the name, as 
used in that possible world, may refer to a different individual or that the individual so-
called in the actual world may be referred to by a different name. Moreover, we can also 
use the name in ways that make it clear how it could be used in a counterfactual situation.  
Bach goes on to explain that when we use a definite description or proper name to 
refer to an individual, we are not trying to inform the listener about which properties are 
unique to the individual. Rather, we are merely trying to identify who we are talking 
about.  
 
When you use a name to refer, generally the property of bearing the name 
does not enter into what you are trying to convey….Rather, you intend the 
property of bearing the name merely enable your audience to identify who 
you are talking about (2002, 87).  
 
So, when we use a name to talk about an individual in a counterfactual situation, we are 
not mistakenly trying to inform the listener that said individual is called by that name in 
the counterfactual situation. Rather, because the individual in question is already 
identified in this world as bearing that name, it is merely a tool for identifying the 
individual. The use of the name, or even the description, is not intended to tell us 
anything about the properties that the individual bears in the counterfactual situation; 
rather it is a tool for allowing us to communicate information about individuals across 
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possible worlds. This is because we must first be able to identify the individual in the 
actual world, in order to communicate information about the individual as they are 
characterized in the possible world. If doing so requires describing the individual as they 
actually are, this should not be considered a hindrance to our ability to explain how that 
person might have otherwise been different. 
According to Kripke, a name is a rigid designator exactly because it was 
determined, by a baptismal act of naming, that it would refer to the particular individual 
that it designates. Because the individual in question is necessarily the referent, this holds 
across possible worlds. Bach has quite a different reason why it is that a name, as used in 
the actual world, is understood as referring to the individual who bears it in the actual 
world even if we are using it to talk about individuals in some possible world. This reason 
is simple. In order to understand which individual we are talking about, we must be able 
to identify them in some way. Once we have identified the bearer of a name in the actual 
world, we have a way of identifying that individual. Since we understand that the name 
identifies them in this world, it is convenient to use the same name to identify them in 
possible worlds. So, in saying that a name N is semantically equivalent to the “the bearer 
of ‘N’”, we are saying that since we already know that that individual is the actual bearer 
of N, we can use that fact to identify that same individual in all possible worlds. This 
does not say anything about whether or not that description is apt in other possible world. 
Rather it says that since it is apt in this one, it makes exactly who we are talking about 
clear.
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Chapter 4 – Conclusion: Comparing Soames and Bach 
 
In the previous two chapters I have outlined and discussed two accounts of proper 
names that are motivated by Kripke’s objections to Russell’s Description Theory of 
Names (DTN). Soames’s view is a refinement and extension of Kripke’s rigid 
designation account of names. He adopts Kripke’s Modal Argument (MA) against the 
semantic equivalence of proper names and definite descriptions while addressing a 
number of objections that have been raised against Kripke’s view. By contrast, Bach’s 
view of names is presented as an alternative to DTN that recovers the benefits of 
associating a proper name with a definite description, while accommodating the view that 
a name expresses no information except that it denotes the individual so-called. He denies 
that MA is a serious threat to any description theory and argues that rigid designation 
cannot be a purely semantic view. In this chapter I will evaluate the relative merits of the 
each account by considering both the interpretation and responses that each provides with 
respect to Kripke’s MA. Furthermore, I will evaluate each view based on its ability to 
respond to various arguments that the other gives against it. Ultimately, the stronger 
account will more closely reflect the way in which we actually use names. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Soames and Bach give two very different 
characterizations of Kripke’s Modal Argument (MA). While each believes that his 
formulation accurately captures the content of MA, both are motivated by the accounts of 
naming that they endorse.   
Recall that Soames’s presents the following formulation of MA: 
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(1) Proper names are rigid designators. 
(2) Therefore proper names do not have the same meanings as non-
rigid descriptions. So, if N is a proper name, and D is a non-rigid 
description, then the sentences N is F and D is F typically do not 
have the same meaning, or express the same proposition.  
(3) Since the descriptions commonly associated with names by 
speakers are non-rigid, typically the meanings of names are not 
given by those descriptions. So, if N is a name and D is a 
description associated with N by speakers, then the sentences N is 
F and D is F typically do not have the same meaning or express the 
same proposition (Soames, 1998, 2). 
 
This version of MA begins with the premise that all proper names designate rigidly. This 
premise is based on the assumption that when we use a name to refer to an individual in a 
counterfactual situation, the name always refers to the individual who is so-called in the 
actual world. From this he concludes that if a name is a rigid designator and a definite 
description is not, then the name and the description cannot have the same meanings. 
This inference is based on the assumption that when we use a definite description to refer 
to an individual in a counterfactual situation, the definite description always refers to the 
individual who fits the description in that counterfactual situation. That is, there may be 
some possible world in which the description designates an individual that is distinct 
from the one designated by the name. As a result, depending on the properties held by the 
individual in a counterfactual situation, on this view the name and the description may 
fail to co-refer. From this, Soames concludes that a name cannot have the same meaning 
as a non-rigid definite description.  
Soames’s focus on the rigidity thesis is motivated by a belief that names and 
definite descriptions are essentially different. That is, that they do not have the same 
modal properties, and so cannot have the same meaning. As discussed previously, he 
claims that the ultimate ground for the belief that names are rigid designators is his 
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principle (GR) which tells us that when we use a name to talk about a counterfactual 
situation, the truth of any proposition in which that name figures depends on whether the 
proposition expresses a truth about the individual who bears the name in the actual world.  
While this does seem to be an accurate representation of our standard use of 
names, it does not take into account non-standard but legitimate uses of names such as 
those discussed in the previous chapter. Such uses suggest that the name itself does not 
semantically fix the content of the alleged proposition sufficiently to produce or 
underwrite (GR), which is largely based on what Kripke calls our “intuition” about how 
names function in modal contexts. If, as Bach points out, Kripke really believes that the 
full extent of a name’s semantic function is to convey the fact that it names the individual 
in question, it is difficult to see how it is a semantic fact that a name such as ‘Aristotle’ 
can be assumed to always denote the same individual regardless of context. Kripke’s 
intuition about the behavior of names in modal contexts is based on the observation that if 
there is an individual with whom we already associate the name, unless we are given 
evidence to the contrary, we tend to assume that it is that individual to whom the name is 
intended to refer.  Thus, there is nothing in the semantic content of a name that requires 
that when we use it we do so to refer to the individual so-called in the actual world and 
not in any other possible world, or to any other individual who bears the name in the 
actual world in the case of shared names.  
Let us consider the name ‘Aristotle’. There is nothing inherent in this name that 
requires that it be used to refer to Aristotle the philosopher rather than Aristotle (Onassis) 
the shipping magnate. Moreover, there are conceivable uses of both ‘Aristotle’ and 
‘Aristotle Onassis’ that do not denote either of these individuals, nor do they denote any 
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other individual in the actual world. It would be equally legitimate to use such a name in 
the following context ‘It might have been the case that Aristotle was a space shuttle’. In 
an appropriate context of use, the listener can easily grasp the speaker’s meaning. This is 
because it is our implicit understanding of the name used in context that produces the 
sense of rigidity.  
Thus, it does seem that Soames’s formulation reflects the apparent reliance of 
Kripke’s argument on the intuitions that we have about the meanings of names, which are 
based on our standard uses of proper names. However, it lacks an explicit explanation of 
why names are rigid whereas descriptions are not. As noted above, this distinction is 
based on the assumption that the reason that names are rigid while descriptions are not is 
that a name directly denotes exactly one individual in all possible worlds while a 
description denotes the individual who satisfies it in any given world. Without explicit 
explanation of the assumptions on which the argument is based, it is difficult to 
understand why one would believe that proper names and definite descriptions designate 
their bearers in essentially different ways.  
The formulation of MA that Bach presents is quite different. Recall that according 
to his account: 
 
(a) If ‘N’ meant ‘the F’ then ‘N might not have been the F’ would be 
false. 
But 
(b) ‘N might not have been the F’ is true. 
Therefore, 
(c) ‘N’ does not mean ‘the F’. 
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Assume here that ‘N’ has but one bearer, that N is the actual F, and that 
‘the F’ is the description which, according to the description theory in 
question, is synonymous with ‘N’. (Bach, 1987, 150). 
 
Bach’s version of MA begins with the premise that if the name ‘N’ was synonymous with 
the definite description ‘the F’, then the sentence ‘N might not have been the F’ would 
express a false proposition. This premise is based on the assumption that if a name and a 
description co-refer, then the individual so-called must possess the property expressed by 
the description in all possible worlds. However, the second premise is based on the 
observation that the sentence, ‘N might not have been the F’ expresses a true proposition. 
In the Kripkean tradition this observation is justified by consideration of various 
examples on which the descriptions associated with names under DTN largely express 
accidental qualities. (This is typically an artifact of making the description sufficiently 
specific to uniquely designate a referent in the actual world.)  Hence the individual in 
question may fail to possess the property expressed by the description. The conclusion of 
this argument is that ‘N’ is not synonymous with ‘the F’, since the individual, N, need not 
possess the property expressed by ‘the F’ at every possible world.  
In critiquing this argument, Bach grants arguendo that at most one individual 
bears each name in the actual world.  Bach’s focus on the use of names in context is 
motivated by the observation that while names standardly take wide scope, they can also 
be used as though they were descriptions taking narrow scope. He claims that MA can 
only effectively discredit description theories if the speaker always intends to use the 
name ‘N’ to refer to the individual so-called in the actual world, behaving like a 
description taking wide scope, and always intends to use the description ‘the F’ to refer to 
the individual who possesses the corresponding property in the counterfactual situation, 
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taking narrow scope. As a result, the proposition expressed by ‘N might not have been the 
F’ must always be “the individual called ‘N’ in the actual world might not have possessed 
the property of being F in some possible world”.  However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, this is not the only way in which we use names or descriptions. The fact that we 
can imagine a world in which the individual N does not possess the property of being the 
F is no more problematic to a description theory than the fact that we can imagine a world 
in which that individual was not called ‘N’ is to a rigid designation theory. On this view, 
the modal argument shows nothing more than the fact that definite descriptions do not 
designate rigidly.  
Bach’s characterization of MA is useful because it demonstrates that the strength 
of the argument lies in the assumptions that it makes about the semantic differences 
between names and descriptions. This only becomes evident if we do not recognize the 
rigidity thesis as an explicit premise. Since the view that rigidity is a semantic property of 
names is precisely what Bach is arguing against, it is natural that he avoids explicitly 
invoking rigid designation in his formulation. Instead, he presents the argument more 
minimally, leaving the reader to determine the circumstances under which the conclusion 
follows from the premises. Upon reflection, we see that this can only be the case if names 
are rigid designators, but descriptions are not. 
It seems that both arguments lack certain key subtleties that make Kripke’s 
original formulation of MA so compelling. However, this is to be expected since these 
two versions emerge as the result of very different motivations on the parts of the authors.  
Soames’s version, in as much as it captures the importance of the intuition of rigidity and 
takes it to reflect a semantic fact about names, seems to capture the argument’s reliance 
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on the assumption that names do in fact designate rigidly. This is important to his view 
since it is necessary for refuting description theories. Conversely, Bach’s version relies 
on the implicit endorsement of rigid designation based on the fact that the argument could 
not work without it. This is important to his view because it suggests that rigid 
designation is not the result of the semantic content of names. 
The foregoing discussion highlights rigidity as an important feature of MA, on 
which the argument depends for its force against description theories. But as discussed in 
the previous chapter, Bach believes that our ability to use a name to pick out an 
individual across possible worlds is not a semantic fact, but rather a pragmatic 
observation about how we typically use names. This is due in large part to the fact that, 
since the context of utterance of all discourse in the actual world is the actual world, we 
typically use the name that an individual bears in the actual world to refer to the 
individual, regardless of the counterfactual situation under discussion.  
According to Bach, this is not a reflection on the meanings of names, but rather on 
the uses of names. He points to linguistic intuitions to suggest that we can and do use 
names in ways that the rigid designation thesis does not predict, and which RDT must 
characterize as sloppy or metaphorical; for example, the sentence “Ronald Reagan might 
have been the older brother of the fortieth US president” (153). While we could be using 
this sentence to say that there is a possible world in which the younger brother of the man 
who was actually called ‘Ronald Reagan’ was president instead, a permissible 
interpretation is that there is a possible world in which the name ‘Ronald Reagan’ was 
used to refer to the older brother of the man so-called in the actual world.  
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Bach also highlights the difference between uses of names when he distinguishes 
between confusing one individual for another and being confused about which name an 
individual bears. He uses the example of Elvis Presley, and gives examples of ways in 
which these two sorts of confusion are possible. In his youth, Bach reports, he believed 
that the singer of an overheard song was Carl Perkins, the original singer-songwriter of 
“Blue Suede Shoes”. When he realized his mistake, he corrected himself by saying: “That 
was Elvis Presley, not Carl Perkins” (2002, 79). In the second instance, he believed that 
the individual who sang “Heartbreak Hotel” was named ‘Alvin Parsley’. When he 
realized his mistake he corrected himself again, saying: “That was Elvis Presley, not 
Alvin Parsely” (79). Bach explains that in the first case he identified one individual as 
having the property characterized by a description, when the true bearer of the description 
was someone else. Conversely, in the second case, he did not confuse the individual in 
question with anyone else. Rather, he predicated the property of bearing one name to the 
individual in question when in fact that individual bore a different name. However, the 
individual to whom he intended to refer did not change. Such examples show that the 
distinction driving Bach’s argument is not esoteric; names can be used straightforwardly 
without overtones of rigidity, or without even purporting (as fictional names do) to 
designate any individual at all.  
If rigidity is not a strictly semantic feature of names, what does this tell us about 
the strength of MA as an argument against description theories? According to Bach’s 
Nominal Description Theory (NDT) names are semantically equivalent to the definite 
descriptions which express the property of being so-called. That is, the name ‘N’ has the 
same semantic content as the description “the bearer of ‘N’”. According to Bach, 
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descriptions are “semantically incomplete” by which he means that there is no individual 
who is uniquely characterized by the property predicated by the definite description. So 
too are names, then, by extension. Thus, the linguistic meaning of a name does not 
provide all of the information necessary to determine the individual to which it refers. 
That information is provided in the context of use based on what we can reasonably infer 
about the speaker’s intention. If this is the only way to determine the referent of a name, 
then it seems that MA fails at the outset. If the claim that names designate rigidly is false, 
then the argument is not valid. 
As we have seen above, Bach draws a distinction between the meaning of a name 
and the individual to whom that name refers. On his view, the meaning of the name 
comprises the univocal nominal description, independent of how the name is used. We 
cannot determine what it is that a speaker intends to communicate by using the name, 
without information provided in the context of utterance. This is because nominal 
descriptions do not have direct referents but are syncategorematic. That is, they are only 
meaningful when joined with other words to form a sentence. Thus, information about 
how the speaker intends the name to be understood is determined pragmatically because 
names do not provide sufficient information for use to determine their references out of 
context.  
Since Kripke first introduced MA, a number of arguments have been presented 
that claim to account for the semantic equivalence of definite descriptions with proper 
names, as rigid designators. One such argument is the argument that definite descriptions 
always take wide scope with respect to the modal operator. As demonstrated by 
discussion of wide scope descriptions in the previous chapter, this interpretation does not 
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accurately capture the behavior of proper names or definite descriptions, as both can and 
do take narrow scope. Another such argument is the one on which names are semantically 
equivalent to actually-rigidified descriptions, against which Soames presents an 
argument. I have already demonstrated why, if we properly understand this view, we can 
see that the argument that Soames gives against it is the result of a confusion about what 
it means for us to believe something of an individual in the actual world. Moreover, 
Soames fails to allow that, since the modifier “actual” is indexical to the context of 
utterance, if an individual in the actual world ascribes a belief to a speaker in some 
counterfactual situation as being about the actual greatest philosopher of antiquity, the 
belief in question is about the greatest philosopher of antiquity in the actual world. So, we 
can use such terms to characterize the beliefs of individuals in counterfactual situations 
without ascribing beliefs about the actual world to them. Similarly, individuals in those 
counterfactual situations can use them to make statements about our beliefs without 
ascribing beliefs about their world to us. 
In any case, NDT cannot be read as a version of an actually-rigidified description 
theory.  There seem to be a number of similarities between the actually-rigidified 
description view and NDT, stemming from the fact that both views depend on the context 
of use to determine the referent of the name. As a result, each accommodates the 
intuition, based on the standard use of names, that when we use a name, we typically do 
so with the intention of referring to the individual so-called in the actual world. However, 
there are also key differences between them which result in very different interpretations 
of names. 
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One such difference lies in the fact that Bach denies the indexicality of proper 
names. His understanding of names as semantically incomplete descriptions is similar to 
an understanding of names as indexical since both depend on the context of utterance to 
provide the information necessary for determining which, if any, bearer of the name the 
speaker intends to refer to. However, an account on which names are indexical assumes 
the name is explicitly semantically incomplete, so to speak. An account on which names 
are only typically or contingently semantically insufficient to determine a unique referent 
considers the determination of referent to be a purely pragmatic matter. Bach argues 
against the account of names as indexical because he wants to give a theory that treats the 
semantics of names identically whether or not there is more than one individual so-called. 
As he explains the indexical account, the meaning of a name would depend on whether or 
not the name is shared.  
 
Consider complete definite descriptions and proper names having only one 
bearer. No one would suggest that they are indexicals – and no one has. If 
they are not, however, then the indexical view has a consequence that 
seems theoretically arbitrary: whether or not a description is complete 
affects the semantics of the sentence it occurs in. Surely the semantics of 
such a sentence cannot depend on the answer to that factual question 
(1987, p. 84). 
 
This reasoning applies to names and descriptions shared across possible worlds as much 
as to those shared within the same world. The semantic content of a name, whether or not 
it is complete, is independent of the number of individuals so-called. In order for this to 
be true, the semantically equivalent definite description must be the same regardless of 
the number of individuals who bear it in any and all worlds. If we say that a name refer to 
“the actual bearer of ‘N’”, we must assume that there is some individual in a possible 
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world who bears that name, in that world, and that the individual in question is not 
identical to the individual so-called in the actual world. 
Hence Soames’s argument against the actually-rigidified description account 
poses not threat to NDT. This is true for two reasons. First, even if the argument 
presented by Soames were correct, Bach rejects the interpretation of names as having an 
element of indexicality built into their semantic structures. Second, a similar argument 
made against NDT would fail for the same reason that it fails against the actually-
rigidified view. That is, what Soames’s argument fails to reflect is the pragmatic fact that 
the information conveyed by the use of a name depends on the context in which it is used. 
NDT not only provides an account on which the semantic equivalence of a name 
to a definite description does not require that the individual possess the same accidental 
property in all worlds, it appears to suggest a solution to the Frege’s question regarding 
the informative nature of identity statements. Let us apply NDT to the question of how 
statements such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ are informative while those of the form 
‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ are trivially true. By substituting the nominal description for the 
name, we see that the former tells us that the bearer of ‘Hesperus’ is identical to the 
bearer of ‘Phosphorus’ while the latter tells us that the bearer of ‘Hesperus’ is identical to 
the bearer of ‘Hesperus’. Without inquiring into the identity of their bearers, such an 
account shows us that we gain additional information about the identity of the bearer of 
each name, when we are told that they denote the same individual. So long as the ‘is’ in 
question is one of identity and not of predication, NDT confirms and accounts for the 
intuition that the former is informative while the latter, while true, is trivial. 
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  Of the questions that an account of proper names must address, one that we have 
yet to resolve is that of vacuous names. NDT suggests that a view of names as incomplete 
definite descriptions of the form “the bearer of ‘N’”, the referents of which are 
determined by the context of utterance and our inferences about speaker intentions,  
should provide us with sufficient information to determine the truth values of statements 
in which all names figure, including vacuous ones. However, NDT does not address this 
problem. While the theory implies that to understand sentences containing vacuous 
names we must determine the intention of the speaker based on the context, it does not 
suggest a method for determining the truth value of the proposition expressed. This is 
simply a result of the fact that, in the case of non-referring names, there is no individual 
about whom we can say that the sentence expresses a proposition, be it true or false. 
However, the truth values of propositions depend on facts about the world, and not the 
semantics of names, so a reasonable answer to the problem of vacuous names for Bach is 
that it is not a problem. Semantically, vacuous names are no different from any other.  
Having delineated the accounts of naming advocated by Soames and Bach 
respectively, and evaluated each on the strength of their account both independent of and 
relative to the other, we can draw some general conclusions. These conclusions are based 
on a number of considerations about the nature of each account and its ability to explain 
the use of proper names in natural language. As we have seen, Soames’s account echoes 
the view originally put forth by Kripke. Like Kripke’s account, it relies on a semantic 
conception of rigidity. The arguments that he provides against description theories are 
based solely on this conception, which has remained widely accepted for the past three 
decades. The reason for this is that it is intuitively appealing, reflecting the ways in which 
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we standardly use names. However, such arguments fail to distinguish between the 
standard use of names and their alternative uses. Moreover, Bach’s account provides 
principled responses to the arguments leveled against it and theories like it. These 
responses reflect our actual uses names, based on the understanding that names are 
semantically incomplete. This explains both how names have the semantic content of 
definite descriptions and how they can be used to directly denote the individual so-called. 
Upon consideration of these factors, NDT seems to provide a better account of our uses 
of proper names than the rigid designation thesis as presented by Kripke and Soames.  
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